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This month's focus: A Note From the Chair Philosophy: Pop Culture vs. Academia Applying Ethics Mathematicians Find "Proof" Florida Facts Research Shorts Dean's Musings Around the College Bookbeat Grants CLASnotes CLASnotes |
Why Do We Do What We Do?
These are precisely the kinds of questions CLAS philosopher Crystal Thorpe contemplates every day. Thorpe's work centers around ethical theory, meta-ethics and the philosophy of action, or what some in the field call "practical rationality." "I'm interested in questions concerning our reasons for action. Why does it seem we have a reason to refrain from killing, for example, and what's the nature of that reason? 'Morality' gives us reasons to do this or that, and reasons to refrain from this or that. But, exactly what is morality?" A new member of the UF Philosophy Department, Thorpe came to Gainesville from Stanford, where she earned her PhD last fall. But the road to philosophy was a winding one for the Maryland native. As an undergraduate at the University of North Carolina in the 80s, Thorpe found herself on the pre-med path. "My BS was in biology," she says, "which is why now, when I teach contemporary moral issues, I focus on medical ethics issues." However, medical school wasn't in the cards for Thorpe. "I didn't think I wanted to be a doctor, but I really liked the stuff you needed to do to become a doctor," she explains. "Not so much the labs, but I really liked microbiology and biochemistry and the theoretical sciences." Academics weren't Thorpe's only focus in those days. She ran varsity track for the Tarheels, competing in the half mile. "The basketball team would run a few laps during our practices at the track," she says, "so I was on a 'hello' basis with Michael Jordan." In fact, as a varsity athlete, Thorpe was invited to usher UNC basketball games, then held in intimate Carmichael Auditorium. "We got to sit right down front," she says. "It was considered an honor." Without a clear career plan, upon graduation Thorpe moved to Philadelphia at the invitation of a friend. "I was slightly lost at the time," she admits. After conducting cancer research for two years at the Wiststar Institute--a cancer research foundation affiliated with the University of Pennsylvania, she spent three years doing Multiple Sclerosis research in the university's medical school department of microbiology. "During this time I was considering going to graduate school in the sciences," she says.
At Stanford, Thorpe steeped herself in Kantian ethics. "I actually wrote half a dissertation on the subject before switching topics," she says. Still strongly influenced by Kant, Thorpe is currently working on a paper called, "The Birth of Autonomy and Kantian Ethics." "Kant, along with Rousseau, was one of the first to talk about autonomy, or freedom, and ethics together," she explains. "There's an idea in moral theory that if you're not free, how can you be responsible for what you do? If you don't freely act, then it's hard to say you're responsible and blame-worthy and all that. So moral philosophers have an interest in claiming that we're free, and Kant did a lot of work in this area that is still relevant today." Despite her affinity for Kant, Thorpe admits that, ironically, the final version of her dissertation mentions his name only once. "It's very influenced by Kant though," she says, "and, in fact, my advisor refers to it jokingly as the 'Thorpe-Kant' view. I learned a lot from studying Kant, but I wasn't satisfied with all of his answers, so I moved on to the contemporary literature--including work on reasons for action--to see what it had to say." That quest led Thorpe to her current work, which is situated in a debate about reasons for action. Philosophers have put forward two views about reasons, Thorpe explains. The "internalist" view says that we only have reason to do those things that will further our desires. The "externalist" view says that not all of our reasons are based on our desires--that there are some things we have reason to do despite the desires that we happen to have. So if you're late for an important appointment and your arch-enemy is behind you, the internalist might say that you don't have a reason to hold the door open; after all, you want to get where you're going as quickly as possible, and you don't feel like being polite to this person you find distasteful. The externalist, on the other hand, might say that you do have a reason to hold the door open, regardless of these factors. Thorpe rejects both views and theorizes instead that there is a middle path between the two, which she calls "non-contingent reasons." In exploring the contours of this theory (which also formed the nucleus of her dissertation) Thorpe wants to shy away from the idea that people ought to act morally because society tells them to. "I want to get at something more fundamental," she says. "What is a reason anyway, and how are moral reasons different from other kinds of reasons? These kinds of ideas drive me." --Jane Gibson
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Scenario: Upon exiting a building, you hold the door open for the person behind you. Do you do this because you've been taught good manners? Because you want to please or help that person? What if you don't know that person, or better yet, can't stand that person? What motivates you to hold the door then?
In the meantime, Thorpe took a few philosophy classes at Penn, and when she happened into a course on German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), her future became quite clear. "It was one of those mixed undergraduate/graduate student classes, and I really liked it," she recalls. "I did very well in the class, too, which was surprising because no one knew who I was--I wasn't a graduate student, I wasn't a major in philosophy, I was just this stranger in a lab coat who sat in the back of the room. That's when I realized that philosophy was cool. I applied to grad school knowing that I wanted to do Kant." 